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Chapter 2 
2.1 The Migration of Elites in a Borderless World: Citizenship 
as an Incentive for Professionals and Managers? 
Markus Pohlmann 
Department of Sociology, University of Heidelberg 
The 21st century has been proclaimed as the „Age of Mobility“ (Papademetriou 
2007) as well as an „Age of Migration“ (Castles/Miller 2009). People from all 
over the world and with the most different social backgrounds, are said to be in-
creasingly moving and migrating around the globe. As for the developed coun-
tries, the populations concern and fear is growing, with the perception of aliens 
pouring into their homelands. Politicians, scientists, journalists and others are re-
sponding in their very own way to this situation. In politics, the legal concept of 
citizenship has recently become one of the key issues for debates revolving around 
immigration policies. But citizenship is not merely a concept; it is also an emo-
tional issue, since the changing legal status serves as a bureaucratic bottleneck for 
many other social policy issues that are formative aspects of any modern nation-
state, especially the citizen‘s right to vote. In recent times, science and politics 
have united in their efforts to understand the effects and consequences of the citi-
zenship status in a more profound manner. Thus, this legal concept promises to 
become one of the most forceful mediums for the patronization of a political inte-
gration of migrants, as well as their subsequent social integration. 
In marked contrast, throughout the 1990s Globalization has been said to bring 
about a change in the concept of citizenship that used to bear on close connections 
to the nation-state. Soysal (1994) even predicted that the emergence of post-
national citizenship will replace the traditional nation-based citizenship. Jacobson 
(1997) also predicted the diminishing importance of citizenship, related to nation-
ality. 
Are these predictions already coming true? Is our world actually composed of 
„transnational citizens“? This article tackles the issue by providing empirical evi-
dence concerning the migration pattern of professionals and managers.  
From a sociological perspective, citizenship is a mechanism of inclusion used by 
nation states. The nation state occupies a territory and assembles a majority of its 
carefully selected members on that territory.1 Citizenship is a multidimensional 
concept that comprises membership in a specific nation-state and the formal rights 
and obligations that this membership entails. But citizenship can also be under-
stood as a status and as an identity. According to Kymlicka and Norman (1995: 
284), citizenship describes both a legal status and a desirable involvement in one’s 
community. The principle premise of citizenship is that nation-states can set and 
2  MARKUS POHLMANN 
 
control the parameters of membership (Gilbertson 2006). The words ‚citizenship‘ 
and ‚nationality‘ are often used interchangeably (i.e., dual nationality, dual citi-
zenship). However, nationality is often used to signify membership in a communi-
ty on the basis of common cultural characteristics whereas citizenship refers to 
membership conferred by a state. Citizens of a nation-state may include those who 
see themselves as part of a single nation based on a common culture or ethnicity, 
but more often include some groups who are seen as outside of national culture 
and incapable of inclusion (Gilbertson 2006). 
In our research, we focus on the formal concept of citizenship as a mechanism 
of inclusion used by nation states. We address the question „who‘s included and 
who‘s not? “ We are therefore not focusing on national identity as an important 
factor in nation states’ decisions about citizenship (Choe 2006: 85). We are more 
interested in how citizenship has been used as an incentive to attract (talented) 
personnel all around the world. First we discuss whether the „brain-drain/brain-
gain“ pattern of migration between developed countries that are members in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) fits with the 
perception of an ongoing „war of talents“. Second, we ask whether a transnational 
management is actually emerging and if this process is facilitated by the open-
door-policies of OECD countries. Third, we suggest an explanation for the labour 
migration pattern that we have found and end with some conclusions. 
2.1.1 Boundaryless Careers for High Skilled People? The Brain Drain - 
Brain Gain-Pattern 
From the perspective of highly qualified employees, globalization is not merely a 
threat, but a chance to move across borders. Compared to the restrictions that low 
qualified employees are facing, national migration policies opened up the doors 
for experts, professionals and managers (see Dreher 2003: 18; Chalamwong 2005: 
488). A fierce competition for desired jobs with high income and reputation is said 
to take place, as well as a „war of talents“ between nations and between compa-
nies to hire the „best brains“. Professionals and managers are said to be the pace-
makers for borderless careers, in a world where money, goods and people are 
chasing each other around the globe (cf. Appadurai 1998: 15). Thus, globalization 
seems to foster the mobility of a new „jet set” of professionals and the establish-
ment of a „world class“ of management. Many others are reaching out to achieve a 
similar way of life. Crossing borders, staying abroad and demonstrating one‘s 
flexibility become necessary as well as desirable prerequisites for meteoric ca-
reers. An unwritten law argues that the greater the mobility, the more rapid young 
talent will rise above the competition. To this end, a lot of countries have paved 
the way for a greater influx of highly qualified personnel, in part by providing cit-
izenship as an incentive. 
Thus, recent years have witnessed growing competition for highly skilled mi-
grants as many OECD countries have opened their doors to workers in the sector 
of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) as well as other highly 
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skilled professionals (see Chalamwong 2005: 489). The globalization constellation 
did change for high qualified people. Citizenship was used more extensely to at-
tract high skills. But according to Chalamwong most OECD and developed Asian 
countries have not introduced special measures to recruit highly skilled foreign 
workers. They continue to rely on their existing work-permit systems. The 
schemes that have been introduced invariably aim at ICT and health staff (espe-
cially care givers or nurses) and intra-company transfers for skilled workers (see 
Ibid 515).  
German students are a role model in this sense; never before in history have so 
many of them studied in foreign countries. Compared with other European coun-
tries, German students rank at the top in terms of mobility. As a sending country 
Germany ranks fifth following China (1), India, the Republic of Korea and Japan 
(BMBF, 2005: 9 f.). A year or an even longer period spent abroad appears to be a 
reliable jump-start to a career, not least due to language proficiency acquired 
along the way. Not surprisingly the number of expatriates is on the rise as well. 
Corporations send their employees to their foreign subsidiaries with similar inten-
tions, thus creating a new form of migration that obviously obeys different rules as 
compared with traditional emigration patterns (cf. Kolb et al. 2004). These differ-
ent rules, rules of intensified and globalized competition, imply international and 
transnational career paths. Therefore, in addition to the emphasis on the role of 
TNCs in the world economy, the rise of „global elites“ has become one of the cen-
tral assumptions of mainstream globalization theories. Along with the internation-
alization of production chains, a transnational management seems to be emerging, 
forming a new world class of business elites (see Hartmann and Kopp 2001). As 
described by Ulrich Beck (1997: 17), these people are able to produce their goods 
where costs are minimal, settle and work where life is most comfortable, and pay 
taxes where rates are lowest. But as elites they are also responsible for many of the 
decisions that shape the world’s economy.  
The sociology of migration has widely ignored these new movement patterns of 
highly qualified labour. Controversies associated with the international migration 
of labour are often subjected to a debate of problems of integration in recipient 
countries. Discussion of these problems is usually restricted to the analysis of eth-
nic minorities, or focuses on low skilled workers migrating between specific world 
regions (cf. Pries 1998: 71; Pries 2003; 2005a; 2005b; Kolb 2006). In the case of 
managers and highly skilled labour, it is assumed that a new international labour 
market is developing (cf. Pries 1998; Castles/Miller 1993; Rodriguez-Pose 2003). 
But although a new form of migration among companies has been observed, it has 
not been systematically taken into account. Even in the literature of business eco-
nomics, where transnational strategies for transnational management are an im-
portant subject, the careers of executives have not been carefully analyzed. 
To examine how the migration pattern of high skilled labour is related to the 
citizenship issue, we are first going to discuss whether there is a brain drain − 
brain gain pattern emerging between developed countries. According to Chalam-
wong, the concept of brain drain first emerged in the 1960s when it was used to 
describe the migration of British intellectuals and scientists to the United States. 
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Mostly, the debate concerning brain drain has taken the perspective of the human 
capital approach. Chalamwong writes: „Governments invest in this human capital 
through training and education and expect a return on their investment when the 
individual becomes economically active, starts paying taxes, etc. “ (Chalamwong 
2005: 502 f.). From this perspective, the migration of highly skilled human re-
sources represents a „loss“ to the sending country, which does not reap the returns 
on its investment in these people. The International Labour Organization (ILO) 
„indicates that there is considerable evidence that the average level of human capi-
tal in a society has positive effects on productivity and growth. Conversely, low 
levels of education resulting from high levels of skilled emigration can slow the 
growth rate of the economy and adversely affect those who remain“ (Chalamwong 
2005: 503). 
Although this point of view is corroborated by statistics on the mobility of stu-
dents and university graduates (cf. BMBF 2005; Han 2005: 38 ff.), images of war-
like competition and exodus are exaggerated. Statistics of the European Union 
show that only 4% (1.2 million people) of all the highly skilled people in its mem-
ber states are foreigners (cf. Jahr et al. 2002: 321). Jahr, Schomburg und Teichler 
(2002) draw the conclusion that the mobility of young European graduates is 
moderate rather than alarming, according to a survey of 36,000 graduates, compar-
ing eleven European countries and Japan. Of those people that graduated in their 
country of citizenship, four years later only 3% had decided to work abroad (cf. 
Jahr et al. 2002: 329). For example, although German students are relatively mo-
bile during their studies, it is a remarkable fact that their eagerness to take a job 
abroad is below average compared to students from other countries. 
All studies that have investigated a possible brain drain from Germany and se-
lected other OECD countries to the USA concluded that it has not been of consid-
erable magnitude. Only a few Germans have permanently settled in the US, and 
the size of this population has remained consistently low (approximately 0.8% of 
the total German population) (cf. Table 1). Thus, the form of temporary residence 
has prevailed as the dominant path of migration (cf. Diehl/Dixon 2005: 714 ff.). In 
the case of the Republic of Korea, there has actually been a substantial decline in 
the number of US residents. The only exception to this trend is the People’s Re-
public of China, from which emigration to the US has remained high. 
The share of people with a university degree and in professional or managerial 
positions has not changed considerably over time. Thus a brain drain is not evi-
dent, neither in terms of population structure nor with regard to the international 
variance in this realm. The large-scale import of labour into Japan and Korea has 
been mostly restricted to low skilled workers, with only low numbers of highly 
qualified personnel from OECD countries (cf. Chalamwong 2005).  
 
Table 1: Growth of the foreign-born US-population by country of birth 
1995-2006 
 1995 2006 Decrease/ 
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Increase 
Japan 358,000 235,000 -123.000 
Korea 710,000 304,000 -306.000 
China 690,000 1,386,000 +696,00 
    
Germany 586,000 594,000 +8,000 
England 608,000 528,000 -80,000 
Italy 446,000 409,000 -37,000 
Source: Migration Policy Institute, Data Hub (2007). 
 
According to this line of research, brain drain and brain gain have a negligible role 
in the contemporary world economy. The easing of restrictions in Japan‘s migra-
tion policy has caused the foreign population to grow from 85.500 in 1992 to 
154.700 in 2000 − across all qualification levels. Notwithstanding that a similar 
trend is visible in the Republic of Korea, but both countries still host a low propor-
tion of foreigners: 1% and 0.3% respectively of their entire population. Most of 
those migrants originate from non-OECD countries such as the Philippines and 
China (cf. OECD Migration Report 2004). In 2006, Japan hosted 271,807 highly 
skilled foreigners (134,132 from OECD countries) compared to 647,407 migrants 
having a low or intermediate skill level. In Korea in 2006, there were 18,406 high-
ly skilled foreigners from OECD countries and 20,982 from non-OECD countries 
compared to 86,676 migrants with a low or intermediate skill level. 
Table 2: Foreign population in the Republic of Korea by level of 












 Total 29,844 28,630 1,158 1,214
 Teacher, Professor (E-1) 1,564 1,516 36 48 
 Language Teaching (E-2) 17,970 17,408 548 562 
 Research (E-3) 2,231 2,139 85 92 
 Teaching of Technology (E-4) 163 151 12 12 
 Professionals (E-5) 451 425 17 26 
 Special Tasks (E-7) 7,465 6,991 460 474 
 
2008 Total High Qualified Workers Art & 
Sports 
Foreign born 531,133 29,844 496,672 4,617 
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In the USA, the numbers are greater but the proportion is similar. There are 13 
million migrants with a low or intermediate skill level and more than 2.2 million 
highly skilled foreigners from non-OECD countries. Germany has roughly the 
same ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled workers (1:8). 
Table 3: Foreign population in Japan, Republic of Korea, USA and 
Germany by level of qualification (2006) 
 Qualification Level and Origin 
 High Medium Low 
 OECD Non-
OECD 
OECD Non-OECD OECD Non-OECD 
Japan 134,132 137,675 196,569 211,291 114,217 125,330 
Korea 18,406 20,982 6,866 48,887 1,445 29,478 
USA 1,287,614 2,235,188 2,381,200 2,659,979 5,084,499 2,934,046 
Germany2 
(2001) 
1,132,000 3,590,000 4,906,000 
Source: OECD-Data (2006). 
 
We are able to conclude that, if measured in quantitative terms, there is an in-
creased mobility of the workforce but there has not been any considerable brain 
drain that would deplete needed resources of OECD countries. Although there are 
serious methodological difficulties in obtaining the necessary data, the evidence is 
straightforward; taking up residency abroad is mainly temporary and marginal in 
nature. The argument that mobility may cause „brain circulation“, or „brain ex-
change“ rather than „brain drain“ will more likely hold for mobility of skilled 
workers among developed countries and not among developing countries (see also 
Chalamwong 2005: 505). Martin (2002) points out that a new era of „brain circu-
lation“ may have begun between Asian countries and the United States. 
The above analysis discussed high-skilled workers as a single group. Next we 
address whether our conclusions extend to top-management personnel.  
2.1.2 Internationalization of Management: „Brain Circulation“ 
There are two forms of internationalization that we will subject to critical scrutiny 
in this section. At issue is the question of whether domestic leaders pursue their 
careers abroad and if they are able to reach the top-positions. But it is also contest-
able if staying abroad as a student or in a leadership position is of any relevance to 
empirical career paths (cf. Mense-Petermann/Wagner 2006; Klemm/Popp 2006). 
According to the data of Germany‘s „microcensus“ there is a considerable in-
crease in the number of foreign entrepreneurs, managers and head‘s of depart-
ment. But their overall share amounted only to 6% in 2004 and 7.3% in 2006 re-
spectively. That is not as much as mainstream globalization theories would have 
led to expect, since the statistics include a multitude of foreign SMEs and execu-
tives that had a temporary assignment in a foreign country‘s SME. And even in 
the top ranks of German companies the picture does not change, according to the 
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data from Michael Hartmann‘s studies. He reports (Hartmann 2007a: 59) similarly 
low percentages of foreign personnel in top-management positions. In-between 
1995 and 2005, the absolute number of foreign top-managers in Germany’s top 
100 companies has risen from 2 to 9, but many of those come from neighbouring 
Austria or Switzerland. There are neither British nor US-American citizens at the 
top of a German company. And the 10% of foreign citizens among the 416 board 
members in 2005 had usually remained in the corporation after a takeover (cf. 
Hartmann 2007a: 59 f.). 
If one is to assume a global market for top-managers the German segment is 
typical in an international comparison. The share of foreign top-managers in 
France‘s 100 biggest enterprises has remained steadily at 2% between 1995 and 
2005. In case of the USA, according to Hartmann, only 5% of CEOs have been 
raised abroad (cf. Hartmann 2007b). The SpencerStuart CEO-report counts 16 for-
eign CEOs in USA‘s 100 biggest enterprises in 2008. Surveying East Asian coun-
tries produces similar results, in some cases even with lower shares of foreign per-
sonnel than in German companies. The results seem pretty homogenous, the only 
exception in the sample being the case of Great Britain with a remarkable rate of 
foreign top-managers that amounts to 20%. However, this portion consists mostly 
of people from Commonwealth-countries. 
Table 4: Foreign Top-Managers among the board of directors of top 100 
companies in China, Japan and Korea (Chaebol) 








Foreigner  0 4 4 
Has Studied Abroad 7.1% 21.8% 30% 
Has Worked Abroad ≥ 1Y 9.1% 40% 43.3% 
Source: Own Research.4 
 
On the Chinese mainland the top 100 industrial enterprises are state-owned in 
great measure. Roughly 76% of these enterprises have a CEO who is at the same 
time board member of an important subcommittee of the communist party. That is 
one of the reasons why foreign personnel cannot be selected for these positions. In 
Korean chaebol, the influence of family clans prevails and secures their dominion 
in the companies‘ boards, by building informal networks between formally auton-
omous enterprises. Measures of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 
wake of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s have not changed this fact at 
all. And also in Japan the modernization of industrial consortiums has not led to 
the allocation of international personnel to domestic top-positions. 
With regard to the middle management, our case studies of German industrial 
companies show the same pattern as reported above. So-called „Inpatriates“, the 
residing foreigners, are largely occupied as professionals, not as executives. In our 
case studies we found a quota effectively ranging from 4% to 6% of inpatriates in 
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middle and upper management positions. Yet again to a great extent these people 
come from EU countries, especially from Austria and Switzerland. Thus, consid-
ering middle management positions there are no signs of an international market 
for executives of any significant proportion or of any relevance for career paths. 
Preliminary data gathered from case studies in the U.S. chemical industry show a 
quota of foreign citizenship in senior management positions of approximately 8%. 
2 out of 25 senior managers in the sample had actually moved to the U.S. Accord-
ing to our case studies of the big business conglomerates in Korea, they have es-
tablished think tanks that include international talents that have staff functions, but 
those recruited from abroad remain outside of the line organization (cf. Pohlmann 
2002). The same applies to Japanese consortiums. 
These findings lead to the conclusion that that national career patterns prevail 
with regard to top positions in management. There is little reason to believe in the 
significance of brain drain or brain gain. Our data is consistent with the idea that 
internationalization of management is a matter of brain circulation: that is tempo-
rary residency abroad. In terms of international student exchanges between uni-
versities and the number of expatriates send abroad there is a substantial rise in 
numbers as well as in importance for national career paths (cf. Diehl/Dixon 2005: 
715 f). This holds also true for the cases of Japan and Korea. Studying or working 
abroad is a means of internationalizing one‘s career profile. 
Hence, the chances of staying abroad are limited. A longer duration bears risks 
regarding the loss of important domestic opportunities, especially the problem of 
missing opportunities for advancement in the national domain. Thus, in our view 
the main mechanism of internationalization is a temporary assignment. 
2.1.3 Domestic Careers Instead of International Markets 
The picture that mainstream globalization theories suggest is an exaggeration of 
actual results with respect to the internationalization of management. Although 
management experiences in a foreign country gain in relevancy, a majority of ca-
reers are pursued exclusively in the national domain. An international executives‘ 
market among OECD countries has yet to be established. The reason for this is 
that in all three world regions under scrutiny there is a strong preference for do-
mestic careers. 
Whereas in Germany their relevance is lowest, accounting for roughly half of 
all CEO positions in 2005 (cf. Hartmann 2007a), data from Spencer Stuart show 
that newly appointed CEOs in the top 500 U.S. companies were „insiders“ in more 
than 80% of all cases in 2008. Such domestic careers are absolutely predominant 
in East Asia, accounting for roughly 74% to 82% of all career paths. 
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Table 5: Domestic Careers of CEOs in Top 100Industrial Enterprises in 









Domestic Careers 81.8% 79.2% 74% 
Job Tenure 18.7 years 27 years 24.7 years 
Age  55.3 years 62.7 years 59.7 years 
Source: Own Research.6 
 
Especially in Japan and South Korea averages of age as well as job tenure of 
CEOs exceeds even high expectations. Reforms and restructuring were not able to 
change such a clear preference for insiders. The recruitment of outsiders to an ex-
tent as in Germany is exceptional in international comparison. But if conglomer-
ates recruit outsiders their selection favours the candidates of dominant coalitions 
and networks, according to our research. Thus, neither external nor the internal la-
bour markets of organizations can account for these decisions. 
The hypothesis that a new transnational management has emerged cannot be 
sustained by our empirical findings. Citizenship neither works as an incentive for 
the high skilled workers of OECD countries nor for the economic elites of devel-
oped countries, yet. The „war of talents“, fought with „open door“ migration poli-
cies on international markets is an exaggerated as well as misleading depiction, if 
not a myth, of mainstream globalization theories. 
2.1.4 Conclusions  
Does globalization lead to global markets for managers and international careers? 
The hypothesis of the globalization literature that a transnational management is 
emerging out of a global „war of talents“ was examined in this article, by using 
data on the migration of managers from the U.S., East Asia and Germany. The da-
ta show that no significant brain drain between these countries is taking place; 
„brain circulation“ of insiders with short-term stays abroad is the dominant career 
pattern. The less likely the exchange of an installed CEO, the more career systems 
are used for status achievement by Clans and the stronger the influence of infor-
mal cultural rules, the higher is the rate of insiders. Thus, between the U.S., Ger-
many and East Asia no significant global markets for managers have been evolv-
ing, yet.  
The open-door policies of the nation-states do not change that picture. Citizen-
ship does not work as an incentive. It cannot attract talented people all around the 
world, because they still have to face substantial disadvantages by continuing their 
careers abroad. The underlying career systems inside their specific firm and the 
role of internal labor markets for high skilled personnel did not change in line with 
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the expectations of the globalization literature. To deal with globality inside and 
outside of those groups of globally operating firms makes it even more necessary 
to rely on trust, loyalty and informal cultural rules inside the firm’s networks. 
Thus, Globalization is rather fostering the importance of insider career systems for 
the firms recruiting practices, instead of opening it up for outsiders.  
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 Attribution and acquisition of citizenship are structured on two principles: jus so-
li (the conferral of citizenship to persons born in the state's territory, or soil) and 
jus sanguinis (the conferral of citizenship to persons with a citizen parent or par-
ents, or blood). Most nation-states base their citizenship laws on a combination of 
jus soli and jus sanguinis (see Gilbertson 2006). 
2
 Since there was no data available for Germany in 2006, the reported numbers 
originate in SourceOECD International Migration Statistics (2001). 
3
 If one looks at the Chaebol instead of solely focusing on industrial enterprises, 
then there are six CEOs with a foreign citizenship. 
4
 The research received the support of Isabel Burkert in the case of Japan (cf. 
Burkert 2007), in the case of China support came from Yuan Yuan Liu and in the 
case of the Republic of Korea it was Jong-Hee Lee, who aided in acquiring the da-
ta. 
5
 The data refer to the total of top 100 consortiums in the Republic of Korea. 
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